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Investment,Innovation
and Growth
Amongthe significant, but relatively intractable, issues in the study of QR-
regimes is whether they have any discernible impact on the inducement to
invest and the inducement to innovate.
The former question is of interest, because some LDCs presumably are
in a position where the emergence of an adequate number of entrepreneurs to
exploit economic opportunities is a prerequisite for industrialization. Hence
if we can argue that QRs provide the economic framework needed to induce
investment, that should be considered a merit of the OR-regime. On the other
hand, we must also ask whether such inducement, if needed, could not also
be provided by alternative policies; and whether such an alternative set of
policies would not have resulted in a more efficient pattern of investments.
Closely linked to this is the question of the inducement to innovate.
Efficiency in the pattern of investments is only one aspect of the problem. The
quality of entrepreneurship and the inducement to innovate are recognized by
economic historians and by economists estimating the role of technical progress
in growth to be of at least equal importance. Can we then relate the OR-
regime to these aspects of the economy as well?
These are interesting, important and difficult questions. In what follows,
we attempt to answer them in light of the Indian experience, warning the reader.
that we are on relatively treacherous ground even as economic analysis goes.
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INDUCEMENTTO INVEST
The notion that India lacked an adequate supply of entrepreneurship and that
a system of automatic protection conferred by the OR-regime was necessary to
induce investment is impossible to reconcile with the facts of Indian history up
to the time that planning began in the 1950s.
The tradition of entrepreneurship in India has lon.g been documented b:y
economic historians.1 Furthermore, this historic supply of entrepreneurship
was not merely for trade but also for industry. In fact, the industrialization
of India started in the nineteenth century and proceeded with moderate, and
even negligible, tariffs during the first part of the twentieth century.2 Further-
more, the leading inçlustrial entrepreneurship tended 1:0 be economically ra-
tional and even "progressive." Thus, Jamshedji Tata, who set up in 1913 the
first successful Indian steel mill, came from a background and fortune in
cotton trade; and he built up an efficient and stable industrial force which was
critical to performance in a steel mill. And Morris D. Morris has shown
clearly how, in the cotton textile industry, where a stabl.e and disciplined labor
force was not critical to performance, the entrepreneurs were willing to ac-
commodate quite different labor practices rather than invest time and money in
changing them.3 In Tata's case, the entrepreneurial activity even extended to
setting up, from the beginning, a school to train Indian technicians to take
over from the foreign personnel at the earliest!
It would appear to us, therefore, that in the Indian context it is not
persuasive to argue that a OR-regime, with its automatic protection for in-
digenously produced items, was necessary to induce industrial investment.
Furthermore, in the Indian case, the public sector has been an important in.-
vestor in industry, thus weakening still further the argument for a QR-regime
to provide automatic and indiscriminate protection to induce investment.
There is therefore nothing in the Indian experience to suggest that India
could not have sustained the desired ex-ante levels of investment in industry
by using a suitable tariff policy, the standard instruments of monetary and
fiscal policy and her public-sector investment programs.4
INDUCEMENT TO INNOVATE
In point of fact, the OR-regime, as we have already noi:ed in Chapter 13, only
served to influence and, in conjunction with the industrial licensing machinery,
to determine a pattern of import substitution that certainly appears to have
been relatively chaotic and unmindful of economic cosl:s. Did it also influence
adversely (1) attention to quality and (2) technical progress? There is also214 GROWTH EFFECTS
the related question: does an export orientation produce better results in both
these directions?
Adverse Effects.
1. Unfortunately, no meaningful statistical index of "quality" can be
devised. On the other hand, it is manifest that in a regime which grossly re-
duces competition (as we have argued) and creates a captive market for many
products thanks to the doctrine of indigenous availability, it would be "rational"
and profitable for an entrepreneur not to pay attention to the quality of pro-
duction. Thus, it is only the "quality-minded" entrepreneurs (like Tata, Ma-
hindra and Mahindra, and Kirloskars, to take the most noted exceptions) who
are known to produce products that approximate international standards of
performance for similar products. For the rest, the effects of the economic
regime appear to be evident, though impossible to quantify: products with
faulty performance because of production defects or defects in the inputs of
domestic manufacture. Even when one has allowed for the bias in evaluation
arising from the fact that, in V. S. Naipaul's words, there is "a craze for
foreign," there is so much general incidence of failure to improve quality of
performance to satisfactory levels, and this is so precisely what one would
expect as the result of the economic regime, that it seems fair to conclude that
the regime has indeed aided in bringing about these adverse results.
2. Closely related to the failure of producers (even in the organized
sector) to raise their output to satisfactory levels of performance, but shading
into the problem of innovation which we discuss later, is the well-documented
phenomenon of "design deficiencies," which Mark Frankena has studied in
some depth for the engineering goods industry during the 1960s.
Frankena carefully explains that he is not discussing design deficiencies
in the sense that Indian producers do not produce to the "latest," capital-
intensive and automated designs, but rather that, even for designs that sell in
the LDCs of Africa and Asia, the Indian are uncompetitive and "unpreferred"
vis-a-vis those of rival producers. He also generally confines himself to
examples that indicate that Indian designs are fully dominated by other de-
signs, no matter what the shadow or actual prices of the factors of production.
We must enter the caveat, however, that, while these examples establish a
prima facie case that the Indian policy environment has produced incentives
for a lag in adaptation to more efficient designs, they do not constitute a clear
verdict to that effect. It is conceivable that the cost of buying or imitating these
superior designs may outweigh the gains from their adoption, both privately
and socially; only if the new designs were available without cost would these
examples be, in themselves, complete proof of our contention. But the examples
do remain strongly suggestive and supportive of our thesis. Let us therefore
quote a few of the more telling ones.INVESTMENT, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 215
For electric motors and transformers, Frankena notes that the Indian
Tariff Commission Report of 1966 stated that:
Indian motors were larger and much heavier than motors of the same
horsepower manufactured abroad and that the excess weight was con-
sidered undesirable by users. It also estimated that adoption of foreign
specifications would result in a reduction of 20 to 33 percent in material
costs. The following differences in design and material specifications were
noted: (i) foreign motors used aluminum die-cast rotors instead of rotors
with copper strips; (ii) foreign motors used aluminum die-cast bodies in-
stead of cast iron bodies, which resulted in a reduction of weight; (iii) for-
eign motors had class "E" insulation, which resulted in lower inputs of
copper and electrical steel stampings than were required with the class
"A" insulation used in India. In addition, class "E" insulation enabled
motors to withstand higher temperatures.
In the second half of the 1960's a number of Indian manufacturers
adopted these design changes for part of their production. Nevertheless,
in 1970 the Indian Electrical Manufacturers' Association reported that of
32 manufacturers in the organized sector and 170 in the small scale sector,
only twelve produced motors with class "E" insulation.5
Again, with distribution transformers, the Indian manufacturers were
continuing to use hot rolled sheets rather than cold rolled grain oriented sheets,
with resultant energy losses up to 10 percent and an incremental cost in steel
and copper of nearly 10 to 25 percent.
Among other examples of product-design improvement foregone, Fran-
kena notes cotton textile machinery. The 1967 Tariff Commission Report
mentioned ring frames abroad that incorporated several improved features
enabling them to run at speeds up to 16,000 RPM without mechanical trouble
whereas the Indian designs could not be taken beyond 12,000 RPM: "even at
lower speeds the yarn breakages are sometimes heavy with consequent de-
terioration in the quality and evenness of yarn...therehas been improve-
ment in the quality of indigenous cotton textile machinery after 1963, but
•.. thedomestic products still lack proper designing, casting, standardisation
and finishing. 6
Theseexamples relate to designs that appear to have been economically
dominant over the ones still in vogue in India—in terms of the productivity
of the output in user industry and/or the material cost of unit output itself.7
At the same time, problems of lagging designs were to be found in con-
sumer goods industries as well: e.g., on electric fans Frankena quotes an Engi-
neering Export Promotion Council Report on a 1959 exhibition in Singapore:
Our (Indian) "Usha" and "Orient" table fans lacked the lustrous finish
which was eye-catching in the case of (Japanese and Hong Kong) "Hulda"
and KDK fans. If the revolving device and the finish of our table fans are
improved, I see no reason why the sales should not improve. In the export216 GROWTHEFFECTS
market,it is imperative that we should catch up with the latest design and
construction of the Japanese fans.
and goes on to comment that:
A decade later Indian table fans were still out-dated and inferior in
design, styling, and finish to fans exported by Japan and Hong Kong to
developing countries. Japanese and Hong Kong fans had smoothly fin-
ished and bright-colored stands and plastic casings in modern shapes,
nickel-chromium-plated fittings and protective mesh, and gadgets like time
switches, variable oscillation-angle controls, and plastic piano-style keys
for different speeds. The exteriors of Indian table fans were made of
painted cast iron and steel, the fans were heavy, the styling, surface finish,
and colors were not attractive, and there were no controls other than
choice of speeds. Late in the 1960's, Jay Engineering introduced one
model with variable oscillation control and piano-style keys but none of
the other styling features. Indian fans were also noisier than Japanese
ones.8
3. Next, we should also expect that the lack of competition in the
Indian-type economic regime raises the possibility that firms may choose
"leisure" rather than "profits."9 If this takes the form of being simply sloppy
about reducing costs and increasing productivity from the plant by better
management, this is equivalent to "technical regress" and to social disadvan-
tage. Unfortunately there is no technique by which we could have meaning-
fully detected this effect of the QR- and industrial licensing regime, and we
must leave this purely as an a priori deduction.
4. We may also attempt to examine whether an estimation of technical
progress for the Indian manufacturing sector shows any evidence of increase
in productivity. We may hypothesize that the result of a framework of shel-
tered markets would be the absence of any noticeable trend toward growth in
productivity.'0
We should note initially that labor productivity did increase through the
period of our study. Estimates by Banerjee'1 of the growth of labor produc-
tivity for 1946—64 are presented in Table 15—1. However, it is now clearly
understood that such estimates have little relationship to growth of overall
productivity, and that the superior approach is to proceed by estimating pro-
duction functions and "technical change" therewith.
Recent studies of the growth of manufacturing in India have, however,
come to conflicting conclusions on this issue, depending primarily on the
nature of the adjustments made in the available series on capital. Using the
Solow method of estimating Hicks-neutral technical change, but a capital
series that shows a drastic decline in capital productivity from 100.00 in 1946
to 25.4in1964, Banerjee has estimated a trend rate of decline in neutral
technical change of 1.6 percent in 1946_64.12INVESTMENT, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 217
TABLE 15-1
indices of Labor Productivity
in indian Manufacturing, 1946—64
Indices of Indices of
Labor Labor
Productivity Productivity
Year 1946—64 Year 1946—64
1946 100.0 1956 123.6
1947 94.9 1957 120.7
1948 98.7 1958 133.0
1949 96.6 1959 139.1.
1950 91.8 1960 140.0
1951 97.7 1961 140.2
1952 96.1 1962 156.0
1953 107.8 1963 151.0




SOURCE: A. Banerjee, "Productivity Growth," Table 1.
On the other hand, Hashim and Dadi have used an adjusted capital
series, estimating the purchase value of capital from the available written-down
book-value data by more detailed and careful methods of adjusting for the
age-structure of capital assets and rate of depreciation. Their estimates show
an increase in capital productivity over the period 1.946—64 and lead to a
positive Hicks-neutral, overall productivity change at 2.8 percent annually.'3
Quite aside from their adjusted capital estimates, it would appear to us
that the Hashim-Dadi estimates are probably closer to reality because our
hypothesis of the Indian sheltered-markets policy leading to negligible overall
improvements in efficiency of factor use must at the same time allow for the
fact that new investments in the new industries already embody the growth of
know-how abroad. The estimation of (Hicks-neutral)technical progress,
using the "disembodied" progress assumption, will thus tend to show positive,
and even large, improvements in overall productivity even when there are no
such improvements. Unless, therefore, the estimation of productivity change is
adjusted for "embodied" technical change—a factor of obvious importance
for India which imported the bulk of its capital goods through the period of
our study—we cannot reach a firm econometric conclusion on whether the
framework of Indian policies retarded the growth of overall productivity in
the economy.14218 GROWTH EFFECTS
Other Arguments.
There is therefore some a priori and empirical support, of different de-
grees of firmness, for the view that the Indian trade regime in toto led to, or
accentuated, the lack of attention to quality, design and technical change. We
may now push our analysis in other directions that bear on these issues
equally.
1.If one considers change in overall productivity as the outcome of
technical change (inclusive of managerial efficiency), and if one regards the
degree of domestic sheltering through the import substitution strategy as the
principal cause of decelerated technical change, then one should presumably
expect the following two hypotheses to hold empirically:
(a) that the traditional, export industries (such as jute and tea) should
exhibit higher technical change than the modern, new industries (such as
chemicals and engineering goods); and
(b) that among the new industries, furthermore, the ones that have
broken out more significantly into the export markets and over a longer period
should also exhibit greater rates of technical change than the others.
These hypotheses imply cross-sectional differences, however, which may
well be difficult to detect because of other differences among the industries
that differentially affect the ability to invent and absorb technical change.
For example, it may well be that, owing to the focus of research and devel-
opment expenditures on modern industries in the West, the general rate
of technical improvements that accrue in the new industries is vastly greater
than that in the older industries such as jute and tea where the large Western
expenditures on research and development have no impact at all. Hence our
failure to find significant increases in overall productivity in the traditional
industries may not mean that export orientation may not be an important
factor in motivating technical change.15 Similarly, the period during which
several industries in India have been involved in serious export marketing
may have been too small for any serious inferences from cross-sectional
differences among the different new industries.
We should confess that we have not been able to secure the necessary
estimates of technical change in enough industries, for the relevant time
period, to cast any definitive light on the validity and import of the two
hypotheses we have listed here. But they clearly are of sufficient importance
to warrant a careful examination as more years lapse and data become avail-
able for a longer period to make time-series estimation meaningful (particu-
larly with regard to our second hypothesis).
2. Yet another approach to the relationship of import substitution and
export orientation to technical change is to examine the nature and incidence
of research and development in Indian industries. We must note, in this con-INVESTMENT, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 219
nection, the increasing evidence that research and development expenditures
are finally beginning to emerge on the Indian scene, in a number of import-.
competing industries, that such expenditure is being undertaken by the very
large firms, and that it is undertaken in the process of import substitution itself
and reflects a quasi-Kennedy-Weizsacker process of search for processes that:
would avoid the use of scarce, imported materials and develop the use of
cheaper, indigenous inputs. Of course, as stated earl:ier, this research and
development activity may be expensive in relation to results: but it is certainly
there now and is adding to the technological maturity and expertise that the
country seeks as an objective in itself. Historically, one has only to recall
Japan's transition from shoddy manufacture under bad imitation to decent:
manufacture under good imitation to excellent manufacture under outstanding
imitation to innovative manufacture in recent years. In such a historical per-.
spective, it would appear logical to entertain the strong possibility that at least
some of the inadequacies noted earlier may be due to the difficulties of "first-
stage" manufacture in a number of modern industries and that the growth of
research and development in recent years may represent .a growing transition to
decent manufacture. What is the evidence of research and development in.
modern Indian industry?
Before we discuss research and development expenditure in Indian manu-
facturing industry, it is useful to note that the total as a proportion of GNP
has been steadily rising, having more than doubled between 195 8—59 and
1971—72 (Table 15—2); and that the private sector expenditure on research
and development, while still a small fraction of the total, has increased during
the same period so that it is now over 8 percent of the total whereas in 195 8—59
it was estimated at 0.5 percent only (Table
There is also evidence that the bulk of this private research and develop-
inent expenditure is inevitably concentrated in the larger companies, and that
the level of expenditure generally rises with the size of t:he company.'7 Among
the propositions of interest to our study, however, are the following which
were the outcome of a sample survey conducted by Dr. Ashok Desai at our
suggestion. Before we report on them, we should emphasize that the survey
was primarily focused on chemical and dye (and a few engineering) firms in.
the Bombay region, owing to limitations of finance and willingness of firms
to discuss the issues raised. Of the 18 firms interviewed, 4 were subsidiaries
of foreign corporations, and of the remaining 14, 6 did not belong to the
Large Industrial Houses. Further, of the 14 Indian firms, only 4 were joint:
ventures and the remaining were purely Indian in ownership. Thus, our
sample managed to straddle all the important types of structure operating in.
Indian industry. Based on this survey18 and drawing on the available literature
on research and development in India, we can make the following qualitative.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































import substitution strategy does not eliminate the incentive to conduct re-
search and development but merely imparts a bias toward conducting it in a
different direction, so that the really important question then is not whether
it is eliminated by the import substitution strategy but rather whether the kind
induced by such a strategy reduces or increases welfare in relation to the re-
search and development that would otherwise be conducted; and (b) that
orientation toward export markets does not in itself seem to increase the
incentive to conduct research and development, so that it is difficult to sustain
the argument that an export promotion strategy is superior to an import sub-
stitution strategy because it will lead to greater (and presumably welfare-
increasing) research and development in the economy. Let us therefore turn
to a series of propositions that emerge, somewhat tentatively, from our
analysis.
Origins and Types of Research and Development in Indian Industry.
There are basically three types of activity that seem to have provided the
impetus in Indian industry to set up research and development cells of one
kind or another.
QUALITY CONTROL
Firms that started with quality checks often found that processing costs
could be brought down by checking quality at a number of production stages
instead of checking it after final manufacture. Thus, quality control led to
process control, and process control often extended into a study of the
processes and possibilities of improving them. Thus, one of the engineering
firms surveyed by Desai used to check the quality of its castings from early on.
During the 1966 recession, it tried to bring down the rejection rate by intro-
ducing checks at a number of stages—knockout, fettling, finishing, repairing
and machining. It was thereby able to reduce the amount of work done on
castings that were eventually rejected, and to bring down the mean fettling and
finishing man-hours per ton from 110 to 80.
TECHNICAL SERVICES
The demand for some products, mainly chemicals, was not confined to
one uniform quality; the quality demanded varied with the use for which it
was required. Some tailoring of quality to customers' needs was involved.
Hence technical services were associated with sales to develop qualities re-
quired by customers. Sometimes the demand for a particular quality demanded
by a customer was too small, and the customer had to be persuaded and
helped to use a substitute in greater demand. Thus, orders generated their
own know-how requirements; and, as orders multiplied, the know-how devel-INVESTMENT, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 223
oped to service them was often systematized into general product know-how
and correlated with processes. This emergence of research and developmenl:
out of servicing needs is typical of PVC compounds, which are sold to large
numbers of technologically unsophisticated buyers for a vast variety of uses..
MATERIAL ADAPTATION
Often the policy of blanket import substitution. forced firms to use
indigenous substitutes; and where the domestic and the imported materials
differed in quality, a firm had to work out processes to make the indigenous
product useable. In a sense, material adaptation is a technical service to be
given by the firm wishing to sell a substitute. But the principle of banning
imports of anything that was produced at home relieved producers of the
need to provide sales service; and often the indigenous producers were too
small to solve technical problems arising in the use of their products. Thus,
many chemical firms had to undertake research and development to standard--
ize properties of indigenously available materials and to improve yields achiev-•
able with them. For instance, when one of the chemical firms tried to substitute
Indian turpentine oil for European, it found that only 25 to 30 percent of the
former consisted of alpha-pinene, the basic material for camphor, against 90
percent of imported oil. Thus, import substitution threatened to triple the
turpentine requirements per kg. of camphor. Their technicians proceeded to
analyze the remaining components of Indian turpentine oil, and developed a
number of perfumery materials from delta-3 carene and longifolene, which
were present in substantial proportions. Eventually, the market for these
newly developed materials grew so large that a surplus of aipha-pinene became
available beyond the requirements of camphor manufacture; new materials
were then developed for manufacture out of aipha-pinene. A rival firm, on
the other hand, solved the same problem by using camphene in place of pinene.
Clearly, the process of import substitution itself led to the encouragement
of research and development activity in Indian industry, primarily through
the creation of the need to adapt processes to the use of new, indigenous ma-
terials in many cases, thus supplementing the normal establishment of research
and development-type cells for quality control and customer-service opera-
tions. In fact, this kind of impetus was also imparted by strict controls over
the importation of plant and equipment; and, in some chemical and engineer-
ing industries, this led also to the creation of special plant-designing skills.
Some well-known examples were the caustic soda plant expansion by Tata
Chemicals from internal designing resources and the designing of the pigment
plant by Sudarshan
Of course, in only rare cases did the expansion of research and develop..
ment activity in India lead to its orientation toward what is called "basic re-S
search." In the nature of the case, given the main concern of the firms to learn224 GROWTH EFFECTS
process and material adaptation, the research and development orientation was
to be primarily of the nature of "operational investigations" and "develop-
ment." Most of the research carried on seemed to be short term and focused on
a specific process. For example, at one of the engineering firms surveyed 2,000
motor starters were held up on the p.roduction line for lack of silver salt, and
the problem was given over to the research and development department. This
department then proceeded to investigate what had been used prior to the use
of silver salts, whether other firms used other materials for identical purposes,
and whether the firm could adopt some alternative suggested by such investi-
gations. The research revealed that the firm could use a compound that had
been superceded in starter manufacture in other countries but still seemed to
be the most economical substitute to use in India.
Research and Development and Exports.
The next set of propositions that seem to emerge from our survey relates
to the interaction of exports with the type and level of research and develop-
ment expenditure in Indian industry. It did seem to emerge from the survey
interviews that several of the companies engaged in exporting as a continuous
activity did consider that quality improvement was important, whereas those
firms that engaged in exporting only as an ad hoc activity seemed to think
that quality problems were not important and that the better production could
be diverted abroad whereas the inferior products could be disposed of in the
domestic market. It does seem, therefore, that export orientation did suggest
greater preoccupation with quality of production.
On the other hand, the survey also showed that this export orientation
did not seem to have led to any significant acceleration in research and devel-
opment expenditures or to a more sharply focused research effort. This was
because most research and development expenditure had in fact originated
in response to the problems raised by the adaptation of processes to lo-
cally available materials and spares; and the solution to these problems
generally meant also the solution to associated problems of quality. Hence,
the export orientation of a firm did not seem to lend any significant edge to
the solution of these questions. And indeed some firms even claimed that their
need to engage in research and development had been reduced by expansion
into export markets because they had had to undertake research and develop-
ment to supply a variety of products to maintain a large sales volume at home
whereas concentration on a few, standard items in the export market had
reduced their need for research and development.
It also seemed as if many of the exporters were seriously worried about
getting materials cheaply and readily rather than about quality of manufacture
from these materials. This suggests that, in many cases, the basic research andINVESTMENT, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 225
development problems had really been those of getting familiar with the basic
processes and then of adapting them to the use of available materials; and
that once these had been solved, in the process of import substitution itself,
the fact that the firm had begun exportation did not seem to lend any signifi-.
cant, further impulse to greater research and development activity or its re•-
direction. In fact, this suggests rather strongly that the normal preconception
that export orientation may be linked with the enhancement of research and
development incentives may be true at a later stage of industrialization than
that now characterizing countries such as India, Brazil and Mexico, i.e., a
stage when exportation of new products, resulting from research and develop..
ment, has become an important ingredient of a country's foreign trade, as is
now the case finally with Japan.
Research and Development and Government Policies.
Finally, we must conclude that the net effect of government policies on
iresearch and development, in the Indian context, also reflects the impact of
several other factors: (1) The strict industrial licensing policy meant that, if
research and development was used to develop new types of outputs or new
uses of given capacity, new licensing would be required, with its attendant
delays and new uncertainties whether research and development would lead
to any economic returns. Thus, any "excess capacity" for research that would
result from the development of research and development cells normally
deployed in the ways described earlier could not be profitably used to under•-
take product-diversification research, thus reducing, ceteris paribus, the level
of research and development expenditure undertaken. (2) The early industrial
licensing policy also had laid great stress on joint ventures under which foreign
capital would come into India. This also frequently led to easy and repeated
purchase of foreign technology, reducing, ceteris pan bus, the need to undertake
domestic research and development. (3) Recently, however, the government
was to introduce liberal research and development incentives. Thus by 1971,
research and development expenditure within the firm earned a 33.33 percent
tax allowance; donations to outside institutions for such research earned a
allowance of 27.5 percent; and research contract payments to associa-
tions, universities, and government agencies could be written off up to 10
percent of a year's corporate profit. There were also tax rebates introduced on
sale of know-how: domestic royalties earned a rebate of 40 percent whereas
royalties earned from sales of technology abroad were free from tax.
It is somewhat early to disentangle these different forces at work in
determining research and development efforts in India. But we have clearly
enough evidence now before us to be skeptical of some of the simplistic
hypotheses in support of the export promotion strategy as being research and226 GROWTH EFFECTS
development-stimulating and the import-substitution strategy as being research
and development-inhibiting. Nonetheless, we can still argue, as we did earlier
in this chapter, that the general incentives to reduce costs and to maintain
quality cannot but have been reduced by the sheltered markets provided by
policies of automatic protection and strict control over domestic entry. Thus,
in this sense these policies impaired India's progress toward industrial effi-
ciency at the speed that a framework providing for more effective competition
would have made possible.
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